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THE IMMORTAL REMNANTS OF THE
COMMON-LAW RECORD CONCEPT IN
OKLAHOMA: WHAT A COMMON
OKLAHOMA LAWYER NEEDS TO
KNOW
The Honorable Marian P. Opala*
Emily Duensing**
An Oklahoma lawyer today needs three eyes and synchronic vi-
sion when viewing the prospect of an appeal in the state court system.
Preparing a trial record for review-or for protection from a delayed
attack-virtually demands these attributes: one eye for the past, look-
ing to the common law; a second for the present, focused on title 12 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, where current procedure is found; a third for
the future, attentive to a record's potential defects that could be fatal on
appeal or upon delayed attack in years hence; and finally, all eyes
working together to perceive points on which to rescue the case from a
judgment lost. Unfortunately, the modem lawyer's vision tends to be
too narrow, failing to see the persistent remnants of the common-law
record, sprinkled throughout today's appellate practice, which can be
invaluable assets in any lawyer's "bag of tricks."
* Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court; B.S., 1957, Oklahoma City University; J.D., 1953,
Oklahoma City University; LL.M., 1968, New York University; LL.D., 1981, Oklahoma City
University.
** Third.year student, University of Tulsa College of Law.
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Admittedly, appellate procedure has undergone many changes
since the days of thirteenth century England, wherein lie the roots of
Oklahoma practice. Oklahoma has recognized five different methods
of bringing an appeal from its inferior tribunals to the supreme court
since Oklahoma Territory was denominated in 1889.' Yet the basic
principle of appellate review has remained constant throughout the
centuries: the scope of an appellate court's review of the proceedings,
judgments, or decrees of another court is limited to the "record,"
presented to the appellate court, of matters occurring in that proceed-
ing.2 In addition, the appellate record is-and always has been-com-
prised of other records made in the course of the proceeding for which
review is sought. What have changed are many of the connotations
associated with the term "record" and the various means which have
been employed to incorporate materials reflecting the proceedings into
the all-important appellate record.
The genealogy of these changes is available, in large part, in
Oklahoma statutory and case law-potentially invaluable resources for
any lawyer throughout the course of litigation. But the "true" meaning
of references in those sources to the components of a "record," and the
mechanics of creating one, might easily be lost on one untrained in the
early common-law assumptions on which those references are based.
One who is so trained, though, should be able to discover the means to
leave the "paper trail" so vital to creating a record capable of with-
standing virtually any attack. This Article will attempt to alert the
"untrained common lawyer" to some of those early common-law as-
sumptions and meanings and to show how they remain viable today,
particularly concerning the interpretation of a judgment years after its
rendition, a motion for new trial, and the modem usage of the term
"record."
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE "RECORD PROPER" AND THE
PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL-AN AGE-OLD DICHOTOMY
The origins of all appellate records can be traced to two arenas:
the court clerk's office, where all papers pertaining to a proceeding are
filed, and the trial proceeding itself. Recognition of the early common-
1. These methods of preparing an appellate record are the transcript of record appeal, the
casemade appeal, the original record appeal, the appeal in simplified form, and the appeal by
designation of record. The latter is the current mode of appeal in Oklahoma, although each of the
other modes has contributed to the procedure governing the current method.
2. 4 AM. JUR. 2d Appeal and Error §§ 397-398 (1962).
[Vol. 18:541
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law distinction between these two arenas is essential to understanding
the development of Oklahoma appellate procedure.
Until late in the thirteenth century, the common-law practice of
trying all questions of fact to a jury and questions of law to the court3
provided no means of attacking the jury's verdict or the judge's deci-
sion, in and of themselves.4 Instead, a review of evidence occurred
only via the attaint, a procedure which, though similar to a new trial,
was really a new action attacking the jury.5 Attacks on a judgment also
took the form of a new action attacking the judge, rather than an attack
on the incorrectness of the judge's decision as to questions of law raised
by the pleadings.6 However, a procedure eventually developed
whereby the judgments handed down in the royal courts and its satel-
lites could be reviewed for error without attacking the judge himself.7
This procedure-the writ of error-provided only a very narrow scope
of review and left review of errors occurring at trial untouched. The
record presented by a writ of error was "of a very limited nature; it
consisted of little, if any, more than the required writings, such as the
pleadings, any rulings of the Court thereon, the process, the verdict and
the judgment in the case."8 This record, known as the "judgment roll"
because it originally was transcribed or enrolled on a parchment plea
roll, did not provide a means for review of such matters as motions
during the trial, evidence presented to the jury, or any other in-trial
process.
The mere spoken words of the Court, whether in charg-
ing the jury, in admitting or rejecting evidence, or otherwise,
were not recorded, and could compose no part of its record, or
of the record sent to the reviewing court on writ of error ...
Nor could the testimony of witnesses compose a part of the
record sent up in obedience to the direction of that writ ...
The strict record was all that could be sent to the upper court,
and there was no redress by writ of error for an erroneous
decision that did not appear in the lower court record.9
Thus, only the judge's decisions on issues of law raised by the
3. At common law, questions of law were tried before a four-judge panel.
4. Wilson, Assignments of Error in Appellate Practice, 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 165, 166-69 (1960).
5. I d at 167.
6. I d at 167-68.
7. Sunderland, 4 Simplfled System of Appellate Procedure, 17 TENN. L. REV. 651, 652
(1943).
8. Empire Box Corp. v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 42 Del. 258, -, 31 A.2d 240, 242
(1943).
9. Id (citations omitted). For an extensive discussion of the "judgment roll," its history,
1983]
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pleadings'" were reviewable by the appellate court, because the sole
record available to the upper court was the judgment roll, which con-
tained only the original writ or process" signed by the attorneys and
decisions, orders, or judgments signed by the judge, who was limited in
his decision-making powers.
Although issues of fact'2 were also raised by the pleadings, these
issues, which might be more readily described today as "matters occur-
ring at trial,"' 3 were not reviewable by an appellate court. Technically,
these matters were not "matters of record" but were "en pais""4 and
thus beyond an appellate court's scope of review. Even if a scrivener
had attempted to write down every word spoken and motion made dur-
ing a trial, the writings would not be matters of record because they
had been neither settled by a judge nor approved by the attorneys as
and its elements, see 1 A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS §§ 175-193 (5th ed.
1925).
10. Unfortunately, many court clerk's offices, and hence lawyers, use the term "pleadings" to
describe any paper which is filed in a particular case and which goes into the case file. Oklahoma
law defines pleadings, however, as the plaintifis petition, the answer or demurrer by the defend-
ant, the demurrer or reply by the plaintiff, and the demurrer by the defendant to the reply of the
plaintiff. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 263 (1981). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is considered
equivalent to a demurrer, and thus is also a pleading within the meaning of the law. See Burdett
v. Burdett, 26 Okla. 416,420-23, 109 P. 922, 923-25 (1910), appeal dismissed, 220 U.S. 627 (1911).
Oklahoma has adopted the common-law definition of "issues of law." "An issue of law arises
upon a demurrer to the petition, answer or reply, or to some part thereof." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 553 (1981). Id § 552 describes how issues which are to be examined at a trial arise: "Issues
arise on the pleadings, where a fact or conclusion of law is maintained by one party, and contro-
verted by the other. There are two kinds. First, of law. Second, of fact." These definitions, along
with the "issue of fact" provision, infra note 12, describe issues going to the merits of a complaint
or defense, rather than to collateral issues raised by motion during the pre-trial, trial, or post-
judgment stages (except for a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which goes to the merits).
The dichotomy between issues of law and issues of fact remains viable in Oklahoma today, partic-
ularly in reference to new trial motions. This aspect is discussed atinfra notes 94-120 and accom-
panying text.
11. But see 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 9, § 178, at 351 (noting conflicting authority as to
whether the writ or process was part of the early common law's judgment roll).
12. "An issue of fact arises: First, Upon a material allegation in the petition, controverted by
the answer, or, second, upon new matter in the answer, controverted by the reply; or, third, upon
new matter in the reply, which shall be considered as controverted by the defendant without
further pleading." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 554 (1981). This also follows the common-law definition
of issue of fact.
13. See Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 P.2d 515, 518-20 (Okla. 1964) (explaining differ-
ence between issues of law and issues of fact). Although some "matters of law" do arise at trial,
for example upon a demurrer to the evidence, these are technically not common-law issues of law
and thus are not automatically "matters of record" as are issues of law arising on the face of the
pleadings.
14. A matter enpais is one which is not properly a part of the appellate record. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 882-83 (5th ed. 1979). Enpais is the same as inpals. BALLENTINE'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 404 (3d ed. 1969).
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss4/1
THE OKLAHOMA 'RECORD"
being an accurate record of events occurring at trial. As a result, issues
of fact remained unreviewable.
In 1285, this defect in English practice was rectified by the Statute
of Westminster II,'1 which allowed parties aggrieved by an action or
ruling of the court at trial to bring a bill of exceptions. By taking ex-
ception to incorrect rulings at trial, writing those rulings and exceptions
down, and having the judge settle or approve, sign, and seal the writ-
ing, parties were able to incorporate the in-trial rulings and relevant
evidence into the record to be reviewed by the appellate court.1 6 Once
settled and signed by the judge, the bill of exceptions became part of
the judgment roll to be examined in a proceeding-in-error. The bill
provided the means for transforming matter otherwise "not of record,"
or en pais, into reviewable "matter of record."' 7
This method of appellate procedure, which endured for centuries,
was incorporated, with only minor changes, into the first collection of
statutes for Oklahoma Territory in 189018 as an appeal by "transcript
of the record."' 19 "Transcript" in this sense meant a copy of the judg-
ment roll, as opposed to the term's use today to refer to a "transcript of
the evidence" or a "transcript of trial proceedings" prepared by a court
reporter.2 0
Though the 1890 statutory provisions are somewhat vague,2 ' the
appeal by transcript of the record embraced two possible means of cre-
ating an appellate record: by transcript certified by the clerk alone,
which included signed papers properly a part of the judgment roll, or
"record proper"22 as this record was known prior to 1285; and by tran-
script that also incorporated evidentiary matters into the judgment roll
15. Wilson, supra note 4, at 170.
16. Id
17. See 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 9, § 179, at 351.
18. OKLA. STAT. ch. 70, art. 24, §§ 1-32 (1890). Statutes providing for an appeal by transcript
of the record were repealed in 1968. Act of May 3, 1968, ch. 290, § 4, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 469,
470 (effective Jan. 13, 1969), repealing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 954-967 (1961) and conflicting laws.
19. OKLA. STAT. ch. 70, art. 24, § 24 (1890).
20. See Infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
21. This is perhaps because of the haste with which the statutes were compiled. The preface
to the Oklahoma Statutes of 1890 provides an account of the first session of the Legislative Assem-
bly of Oklahoma Territory, which convened Aug. 27, 1890. According to this account, assembly-
men accomplished in 30 days what should have taken 10 months, so that the statutes could be in
printed form by January 1891. "Mhe session's closing days witnessed an avalanche of legislation,
precluding consideration in detail. . . .Technical accuracy vanished. Legal sense was often lost.
Construction was thrown in medley. Punctuation ran riot." Little, Pitman & Barker, Preface to
OKLA. STAT. (1890).
22. The terms "judgment roll" and "record proper" are synonymous. Short v. Hale, 400 P.2d
816, 819 (Okla. 1965); Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 531, 239 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1950).
1983]
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via a bill of exceptions which had been settled and signed by the
judge.23 The 1890 provisions also included a vague description of mat-
ters to be made, automatically, "of record," stating that only "proper
entries made by the clerk, and all papers pertaining to a cause,and filed
therein . . . are to be deemed parts of the record."24 The reference
here to entries is important, and the use and meaning of that term will
be discussed in greater depth in section IV of this Article.25 The term
refers to the clerk's formal act of "entering" matters of record upon the
trial court's own official journal record. For many years in Oklahoma,
a formal "record entry" of any judgment or order in the trial court was
a strict prerequisite for review of that judgment or order on appeal.
Oklahoma Territory's 1893 statutes clarified what material was au-
tomatically a part of the "record proper," establishing the definition
that still is used today.
The record shall be made up from the petition, the pro-
cess, return, the pleadings subsequent thereto, reports, ver-
dicts, orders, judgments, and all material acts and proceedings
of the court; but if the items of an account, or the copies of
papers attached to the pleadings, be voluminous, the court
may order the record to be made by abbreviating the same, or
inserting a pertinent description thereof, or by omitting them
entirely. Evidence must not be recorded.26
This definition is now embodied, just as it appeared in the 1893
Code, in section 32.1 of title 12.27 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
stated in numerous opinions that the provision is but a modern verbal
garb for the common-law "judgment roll" or record proper.28
The 1893 Code also differed from the 1890 Code in that the major
23. See OKLA. STAT. ch. 70, art. 24, §§ 1-5, 24-25 (1890). The 1890 Code defined an excep-
tion as "an objection taken to a decision of the court upon a matter of law." Id § 1. This same
definition appears in the current version of the Oklahoma Statutes. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 631
(1981).
24. OKLA. STAT. ch. 70, art. 24, § 25 (1890).
25. See infra notes 128-55 and accompanying text.
26. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 430 (1893).
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.1 (1981) ("material for record").
28. E.g., Short v. Hale, 400 P.2d 816, 819 (Okla. 1965); State ex rel Comm'rs of Land Office
v. Whitfield, 200 Okla. 300, 301, 193 P.2d 306, 307-08 (1948); Sabin v. Lavorsen, 193 Okla. 320,
322, 145 P.2d 402,405, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 792 (1943). Each of these cases defined judgment roll
in the same language as statutory provisions. See also Dime Savings & Trust Co. v. Able, 185
Okla. 461, 461, 94 P.2d 834, 834 (1939) (syllabus by the court) ("word 'record' as used in [statute]
is synonymous with or equivalent to 'judgment roll' at common law"); Excise Bd. v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry., 152 Okla. 120, 122, 3 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1931) (defining judgment roll as being same as
statute concerning material for record); Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okla. 277, 296, 190 P. 681, 700
(1920) (also defining judgment roll as being same as statute concerning material for record).
[Vol. 18:541
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provisions on exceptions to trial court rulings were separate from the
provisions on proceedings-in-error. While the 1890 Code's article enti-
tled "Appeal" was comprised largely of provisions applicable to the
taking and preparation of exceptions, 29 these provisions were moved in
the 1893 Code to the article entitled "Trial."30 These changes indicated
a legislative attempt to draw attention to the necessity of exceptions
where they were vital-at trial3 '-and emphasized the still-existing dis-
tinction between "matters occurring at trial" not of record, and matters
apparent on the face of the record. The provisions concerning excep-
tions in the 1893 Code, jI~e. the provisions for the record proper, re-
mained virtually unchanged in subsequent statutory codifications until
1951, when the-,necessity of taking formial exceptions was abolished.
Formal exceptions -were replaced by'a provision which allows that an
objection to in-trial court rtilihgs on-points of law is sufficient to pre-
serve the matter for appeal.32 Oklahoma law remains unsettled, how-
ever, as to whether a bill of exceptions, if one were filed, would be
recognized as a valid expansion of the record proper as described in
section 32.1 of title 12.33 The continued validity of the bill of excep-
29. See OKLA. STAT. ch. 70, art. 24 (1890).
30. See id ch. 66, §§ 311-317 (1893). The 1893 Code provisions concerning the process for
appeal were set forth in the article entitled "Error in Civil Cases." Id §§ 556-598.
31. The provisions on exceptions required the observance of strict formalities when disagree-
ing with an in-trial court ruling. Exceptions could be taken only to a decision on a matter of law
at the time the ruling was made, although any exception later had to be reduced to writing and,
with the evidence necessary to explain it, presented to the trial judge for settlement, or approval,
and signature. However, if a decision was such that it belonged in the record proper, an exception
could be embodied in the decision, as long as sufficient grounds for the exception also were in-
cluded. After settlement and signature by the judge, the bill of exceptions was then filed with the
court clerk who filed the bill "with the pleadings as a part of the record." Id. §§ 311-317.
32. Act of Apr. 9, 1951, tit. 12, ch. I1, §§ 1-2, 1951 Okla. Sess. Laws 25, 25-26 (providing that
formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are no longer required and repealing all con-
flicting laws).
33. So far, the issue has never been addressed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. However,
some Oklahoma statutes suggest the continued existence of the bill of exceptions, even though a
formal bill is no longer necessary to preserve errors occurring during the trial for review. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 578, 611, 616, 637 (1981).
Oklahoma case law prior to 1951 followed the common law in holding that the bill of excep-
tions became a part of the judgment roll, or record proper, for purposes of a transcript of the
record appeal. See, e.g., Industrial Bldg.. & Loan Ass'n v. Cunningham, 183 Okla. 125, 125, 80
P.2d 228, 228 (1938) (syllabus by the court) ("A motion for new trial and an order made thereon
are no part of the record of the trial court which can be brought to this court by transcript unless
incorporated therein by bill of exceptions."); Godfrey v. F.D. Bearley Lumber Co., 171 Okla. 425,
425, 43 P.2d 478, 479 (1935) (syllabus by the court) ("[I1f [the appealing party] desires to bring to
this court any part of the record other than the pleadings, the process, the return, reports, verdict,
orders, andjudgments ... he must incorporate the same into the record by a bill of exceptions.");
Williamson v. Adams, 34 Okla. 317, 319, 125 P. 486, 487 (1912) ("The record proper in a civil
action consists of the petition, answer, reply, demurrers, process, rulings, orders, and judgment;
and incorporating motions, affidavits, or other papers into a transcript will not constitute them a
7
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tions could provide an invaluable asset, or hazard, to an attorney wish-
ing to preserve all important aspects of a proceeding. 34
Although it retained the strict formalities of old English practice in
some respects, the 1893 Code also broke new ground. First, it officially
abolished the writ of error,"3 providing instead that appellate proceed-
ings were to be initiated by a "petition in error" listing all assignments
of error occurring either at trial or on the face of the judgment roll.36
In addition, a "summons in error" had to be served on the adverse
party to the appeal.37 The petition in error, containing all assignments
of error, continues to be used today. 38  The summons in error, de-
scribed in case law as a means by which the appellate court gained
personal jurisdiction over an appellee,39 was later replaced by the re-
quirement that the appealing party give notice of his intent to appeal.4"
This notice is no longer required.4'
The second major break from the common law in the 1893 statutes
was the provision for a completely new, alternative method of appeal:
the "casemade." 42 The casemade, which became the dominant method
of creating an appellate record, provided a more modem means of cre-
part of the record, unless made so by a bill of exceptions."). Each case also further illustrates and
reiterates the basic common-law doctrine that only the record proper, or judgment roll, was re-
viewable, regardless of whether it included a bill of exceptions.
34. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text; see also Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final
Judgments, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 45, 54-72 (1980) (attack may be made on the validity of a final
judgment at any time, either directly or collaterally, if it appears from the face of the judgment roll
that the rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
35. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 582 (1893).
36. Id § 561.
37. Id
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990 (1981).
39. See Hill v. Hill, 49 Okla. 424, 427-29, 152 P. 1122, 1123 (1915). The idea that the appel-
late court needed to obtain personal jurisdiction over an appellee resulted from the common-law
concept of review that an appeal was a brand new proceeding. See Sunderland, supra note 7, at
660. Under the modem approach, however, an appeal is considered a continuation of the trial
court action. Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Price, 198 Okla. 510, 512, 179 P.2d 916, 918 (1947).
40. OKLA. REV. LAWS ANN. §§ 5238-5239 (1910), which dealt with the summons in error,
were repealed by Act of Mar. 23, 1917, ch. 219, §§ 1-2, 1917 Okla. Sess. Laws 403, 403-04. The
session law also replaced the summons in error with the requirement that the appealing party give
notice of his intent to appeal. Id § 1, 1917 Okla. Sess. Laws at 403-04. The notice of intent to
appeal has been described as a means to obtain personal jurisdiction. Callender v. Hopkins, 97
Okla. 41, 42, 222 P. 672, 673 (1924) ("The notice provided in the amendment is for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction of the person in the proceedings in error.").
41. See OKLA. R. Civ. App. P. 1.14(b) ("The mailing of a copy of the petition in error shall
constitute notice of appeal, and no further notice is required.").
42. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, §§ 563-568 (1893). Statutes providing for the casemade appeal were
repealed in 1968. Act of May 3, 1968, ch. 290, § 4, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 469, 470 (effective Jan.
13, 1969). However, the casemade may still be viable. Should the parties to an appeal dispute the
contents of the court reporter's transcript of trial proceedings, "settlement" of the transcript-and
the dispute-by the trial judge would be required.
8
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ating the record on appeal, requiring neither the formal and narrow
judgment roll nor the bill of exceptions. 43  The casemade was but a
term for a court reporter's copy of essential papers on file in the case,
together with his account, in question and answer form, of the trial
proceedings. It thus provided an improved method for preserving er-
rors which occurred at trial, and hence were "not of record."
The wording of the casemade statutory provision was simple.
A party desiring to have any judgment or order of the
district court, or a judge thereof, reversed by the supreme
court, may make a case, containing a statement of so much of
the proceedings and evidence, or other matters in the action,
as may be necessary to present the errors complained of to the
supreme court.44
After making the case within certain time limits, 45 the appellant
was then required to serve the casemade on the adverse party or par-
ties, who could make amendments in writing.46 The amended
casemade was then to be given to the trial judge, who would settle the
statement, sign it, and "cause it to be attested by the clerk, [with] the
seal of the court. . . thereto attached."'47 Disputes over the casemade's
contents were handled at a hearing preceding the judge's settlement of
the casemade.4 1 Exceptions stated in the casemade had the same effect
as if they had been reduced to writing and signed by the judge.49 De-
spite the fact that additional statutes were created over the years to deal
with specific problems arising from the procedure,50 the basic method
43. See OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, §§ 563-568 (1893).
44. Id § 565.
45. Id § 566. The appellant was allowed three days to serve the casemade on the adverse
party, although the judge could extend the time. Id § 567. In later years, statutes permitted
longer time periods for first service and the trial judge still was permitted to grant an extension.
See OKLA. REv. LAWS ANN. § 5242 (1910) (allowing 15 days for first service). The trial judge
could not extend the time beyond the statutory deadline for perfecting an appeal, however. See
Reed v. Wolcott, 40 Okla. 451, 453, 139 P. 318, 319 (1914).
46. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 566 (1893).
47. Id
48. See Charles v. Hillman, 48 Okla. 549, 550-51, 150 P. 461, 461 (1915) (appeal dismissed
because casemade failed to show that appellees were given notice of time and place for settlement
of casemade, and did not show waiver of such notice).
49. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 566 (1893).
50. Such problems included correction of the casemade, OKLA. REV. LAWS ANN. § 5243
(1910); extension of time to make and serve a casemade after a previous extension order expired,
id § 5246; the evidentiary effect of the trial judge's certification of the casemade, id § 5248; the
trial judge's refusal to include certain matters in the casemade (parties could "prove" the contents
in a special hearing before another judge), id § 5249; creation of casemade by stipulation of the
parties, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 966 (1941); and other procedural matters, for example, COMP.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 785 (1921), providing for casemade service on non-residents.
In reference to the necessary steps in perfecting an appeal by casemade, see Barrows v. Cas-
19831
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of making a case, set out in the Code of 1893, was retained.'
In 1968, statutes providing for the transcript of record and
casemade appeals were abolished,52 as were provisions for two other
methods of appeal, the original record appeal and the appeal in simpli-
fied form, which had been created during the 1950's and 1960's. 3 To-
sidy, 113 Okla. 114, 115, 239 P. 581, 582 (1925) (appeal dismissed in part because appellant failed
to serve casemade on all appellees); Pettigrew v. Harmon, 62 Okla. 245, 246, 162 P. 458, 459 (1917)
(appeal dismissed because appellant failed to serve casemade on opponent within time set out in
record entry of judgment, even though court reporter's notes showed judge allowed a longer pe-
riod); Barger-Adams Co. v. Walker Bros., 55 Okla. 637, 637, 155 P. 587, 587 (1916) (appeal dis-
missed because casemade served one day late, rendering it a nullity); Board of Comm'rs v. Vann,
60 Okla. 86, 86, 159 P. 297, 298 (1916) (appeal dismissed in part because casemade failed to show
that certificate of trial judge settling casemade was attested by court clerk and by seal of court);
Ledgerwood v. Neal, 60 Okla. 133, 134, 159 P. 292, 292 (1916) (appeal dismissed because
casemade not filed in same court in which case was tried).
51. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 956-960 (1961) (repealed 1968).
52. Act of May 13, 1968, ch. 290, § 4, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 469, 470.
53. See generally Act of June 1, 1955, tit. 12, ch. 15b, §§ 1-12, 1955 Okla. Sess. Laws 136, 136-
38 (appeal on the original record); Act of July 12, 1965, ch. 464, § 1, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws 906,
906 (repealed 1968) (appeal in simplified form); Okla. Sup. Ct. R. for Simplified App. 1-20, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12 (Supp. 1965) (repealed 1968) (appeal in simplified form). These methods lessened the
appellant's burden in perfecting an appeal. Perfecting an appeal under the casemade and tran-
script-of-record methods required many procedural steps, a great number of which were consid-
ered jurisdictional and thus resulted in automatic dismissal of an appeal or summary affirmance,
However, the original record appeal was perfected merely by filing a petition in error within 90
days after judgment was rendered, regardless of whether the appellate record was ready for trans-
mission to the supreme court, and the giving of notice of intention of appeal. Marshall v. Mar-
shall, 408 P.2d 794,797 (Okla. 1965) (construing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 954, 956.2 (1961), sections
which deal with proper notice and timely filing, respectively). On the other hand, appeals by
transcript of record or casemade required that the petition in error be accompanied by the tran-
script or casemade when the petition was filed. See generally Taylor v. Sites, 296 P.2d 152, 154
(Okla. 1956) ("[A]n appeal has not been filed in time, even though petition in error is timely filed,
unless the casemade is attached thereto and filed also within said time."); Banta v. Banta, 203
Okla. 580, 581, 224 P.2d 592, 593 (1950) (appeal dismissed because "where the petition in error is
not accompanied by a case-made duly served and filed or by a transcript of the record duly certi-
fied, there is nothing for this court to review").
The original record appeal's contents and form also differed from the appeal by casemade or
transcript of record. The "original record" contained the originals of all papers filed in the lower
court, gathered, indexed, bound, and certified by the court clerk, and so much of the court re-
porter's transcript of the proceedings as was designated by the parties. No settlement procedure
before the trial judge was necessary unless the parties disputed the contents. Additionally, unlike
the casemade method where the appellant was required to include all evidence if an assigned error
depended on considering any evidence, the original record appeal merely required that the appel-
lant include only so much of the evidence as was necessary to support his or her allegation of
error. Compare decisions dealing with appellant's burden under the casemade method, e.g.,
Ledgerwood v. Neal, 60 Okla. 133, 159 P. 292 (1916); School Dist. No. 51 v. Trotter, 10 Okla. 625,
64 P. 9 (1901), with those determining burden under original record method, e.g., Massey v. Love,
478 P.2d 948, 950 (Okla. 1971) (trial court judgment reversed because appellant's designated evi-
dence went unchallenged by a counter-designation from appellee); Marshall v. Marshall, 408 P.2d
794, 797 (Okla. 1965) (court's willingness to consider appeal as an original record saved an appeal
that was fatally defective as casemade or transcript).
The appeal in simplified form was even more like the present "designation of record"
method. Three steps were necessary to perfect an appeal in simplified form: proper notice of
intent to appeal, a petition in error filed within 30 days after rendition of judgment, and a $25
10
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day's "designation of the record" appellate procedure was then
established, breaking down the common-law strictures of form even
further.
Yet the common-law forms and distinctions-and the Oklahoma
cases pertaining to them-remain viable today. The judgment roll or
record proper, for example, plays a vital role in preserving a judgment
against attacks on it as void on its face and is instrumental in making a
delayed attack on a judgment in the court where the judgment was
rendered.54 The issue of fact/issue of law dichotomy remains alive in
conjunction with the motion for new trial and there is a plethora of
older, but relevant, cases concerning the type and form of court or trial
records which may be considered by an appellate court. The court
still does not consider some records in the court clerk's office acceptable
for review.56 Moreover, the connotative meanings of terms pertaining
to records, such as "journal entry" and "record entry," have changed so
substantially that a modern lawyer who lacks knowledge of the com-
mon-law underpinnings of early Oklahoma decisions could find it vir-
tually impossible to understand the concepts embodied in them and
their implications for today's appellate record.
II. APPLICATIONS: THE JUDGMENT ROLL IN OKLAHOMA CASE LAW
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TODAY
5 7
Obviously, the term "appellate record" has undergone a variety of
deposit with the court clerk. Time extensions were prohibited. The appellate record was to be
comprised of papers and evidence designated by the appellant and appellee. After the designa-
tions were made, the clerk was to index and bind the originals of all designated records, or certi-
fied copies, upon order by the trial judge and then file the designated record in the case.
Correction or supplementation was available by trial court order prior to transmission to the
supreme court. Okla. Sup. Ct. R. for Simplified App. 1-20, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 (Supp. 1965)
(repealed 1968).
54. See Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okla. 277, 296, 190 P. 681, 700 (1920); see also Morgan, supra
note 34, at 54-72 (discussing necessity of error appearing on face of judgment roll in delayed
attack on final judgment).
55. E.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 408 P.2d 794, 796-97 (Okla. 1965) (describing forms required
for various modes of appeal); Long v. McMahan, 205 Okla. 696, 697, 241 P.2d 185, 185 (1952);
Apple v. American Nat'l Bank, 104 Okla. 69, 70, 231 P. 79, 80-81 (1924) (record entry ofjudgment
required on appeal).
56. See State ex rel Dep't of Highways v. Lehman, 462 P.2d 649, 650 (Okla. 1969) (court
refused to consider an unsigned letter, attached to appellant's brief, which purportedly was from
trial judge and supported appellant's contention that the journal entry filed in the action was not
the journal entry that should have been filed); Render v. Henry Schafer, Inc., 198 Okla. 95, 95, 175
P.2d 330, 331 (1946); Little v. Employer's Casualty Co., 180 Okla. 628, 629, 71 P.2d 687, 688
(1937) (clerk's unsigned minutes and minute entries on appearance docket cannot be considered
by appeals court).
57. The use here of the term "judgment roll" as synonymous with "matters automatically of
11
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transformations in meaning over the years. The meaning of the term
"transcript" has similarly changed. Today, the word is used in refer-
ence to a court reporter's "transcript of trial proceedings," meaning the
stenographically reported proceedings or evidence from a trial or hear-
ing.58 The term's use in Oklahoma case law prior to 1968, however,
was most often in reference to a "transcript of the record," a type of
appellate record that included only the common-law record proper, or
judgment roll.59
When a transcript of record appeal was taken, presentation of the
entire judgment roll was mandatory. 60 As a result, knowledge of what
papers on file in the court clerk's office properly belonged on the judg-
ment roll was vital. Although "material for the record," meaning the
judgment roll, or record proper, has been defined by statute since
before statehood and the bill of exceptions was available to expand the
record proper's contents to include matters occurring at trial and not of
record, problems naturally arose as trial proceedings became more
complex. Written motions and rulings, exhibits, agreed statements of
facts, minutes, jury instructions, and a variety of other papers on file in
the court clerk's office complicated the delineation between matter au-
tomatically "of record" and matter requiring a bill of exceptions. De-
spite the statutory definition, the multitude of Oklahoma Supreme
Court opinions addressing the issue6 1 illustrates that the delineation
was far from clear. An extensive case history of the court's treatment of
record" does not mean that an attorney today has no responsibility for designating such matters
for inclusion in the appellate record. Rule 1.20(a) of the supreme court's rules of appellate
procedure in civil cases mandates that an appellant "file in the trial court... a designation of any
pertinent instruments filed in the case and of proceedings and evidence adduced which are sought
to be included in the record on appeal." OKLA. R. Civ. App. P. 1.20(a). In addition, it has been
held that the attorneys to an appeal, not the court clerk, are responsible for "what is contained in
the record transmitted for appellate review," regardless of the nature of the matter omitted. S & C
Transp. Co. v. McAlister, 528 P.2d 1140, 1144 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (released for publication by
the Okla. Ct. App.). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that, after a timely petition in error
is filed, "Unexcused failure . . . to timely designate the record on appeal . . . constitutes an
abandonment of the appeal and the appeal becomes subject to dismissal." Haynes v. Barnett, 483
P.2d 1140, 1141 (Okla. 1971).
58. This is the meaning given "transcript" in the current supreme court rules governing ap-
pellate procedure in civil cases. OKLA. R. Civ. App. P. 1.20(a), (b), 1.21.
59. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
60. See, ag., Local Union Textile Workers No. 1840 ex rel Bradfield v. Commander Mills,
Inc., 182 Okla. 315, 316, 77 P.2d 705, 706 (1938) (appeal dismissed because transcript of record
failed to contain complete copy of all materials belonging in record proper filed in the case);
Schabel v. Wright, 179 Okla. 73, 73, 64 P.2d 855, 855 (1937).
61. E.g., Industrial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cunningham, 183 Okla. 125, 125, 80 P.2d 228, 228-
29 (1938); Grady County v. Schrock, 53 Okla. 144, 146, 155 P. 882, 882 (1916); Putnam v. Western
Bank Supply Co., 38 Okla. 152, 152, 132 P. 483, 483 (1913); Kingman v. Pixley, 7 Okla. 351, 352,
54 P. 494, 495 (1898).
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the judgment roll is not warranted here, however. The primary pur-
pose of this section is threefold-to reemphasize that the judgment roll
most often parades in Oklahoma case law as a transcript of record ap-
peal; to alert the practitioner to further definition of the judgment roll
in case law; and to show the continuing importance of the judgment
roll to a court attempting to construe a prior ambiguous judgment after
the time of appeal from that judgment has expired.
A. The Judgment Roll in Case Law
The boundaries of the judgment roll were delineated by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1939 case of Dime Savings & Trust Co.
v. Able.62 The appeal, brought by transcript of record, was dismissed
because the appellant mistakenly thought his motion for revivor of a
dormant judgment and the trial court's denial of it were part of the
judgment roll and thus reviewable by the transcript mode of appeal.
The court ignored the argument that the motion was a "pleading"
within the statutory definition of "material for the record" or judgment
roll,63 concentrating instead on the fact that the motion was brought
after the entry of judgment in the case.
A record, in judicial proceedings, is a precise history of the
suit from its commencement to its termination, including the
conclusion of law thereon, drawn up by the proper officer for
the purpose of perpetuating the exact state of facts. . . . The
record ends with the judgment of the court ...
It has many times been held that a motion for a new trial
and order overruling the same are not a part of the record
which may be brought up by transcript ...
It has been held in numerous cases that a motion to va-
cate and set aside a judgment and order of the court thereon
are not a part of the record unless brought into the same by
bill of exceptions ...
.. . Errors which appear on the face of the record, which
is defined as "the petition, the process, return, the pleadings
subsequent thereto, reports, verdicts, orders, judgments and
all material acts and proceedings of the court", prior to the
entry offinaljudgment, are reviewable by transcript of the rec-
62. 185 Okla. 461, 94 P.2d 834 (1939).
63. Id at 461-62, 94 P.2d at 835. Material for the record is now listed in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
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ord duly certified to this court.'
Thus, the judgment roll, or record proper, begins with the plain-
tiff's petition, or amended petition, and ends with record entry65 of the
final judgment or order of the court in the original action. Post-judg-
ment motions and rulings thereon are not part of the judgment roll,
and require formalities in the nature of a bill of exceptions to include
them in the record proper of a proceeding. Dime Savings further sug-
gests that any post-judgment action taken in regard to the judgment
would be excluded from the judgment roll, because of the court's state-
ment that executions "or other writs issued by the clerk to carry the
judgment into effect" 6 6 were matters of fact, or en pais, and thus not
part of the judgment roll. Presumably then, post judgment entries on
the county or court clerk's judgment docket, necessary to create a judg-
ment lien,67 are also excluded.
Although it did not do so, the court might also have found a basis
for dismissal in the appellant's argument that the motion for revivor
was a pleading. Section 263 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes enu-
merates "pleadings" as the plaintiff's petition, the defendant's answer
or demurrer, the plaintiffs demurrer or reply, and the defendant's de-
murrer to the plaintiff's reply. Only these papers come within the judg-
ment roll as pleadings and a motion for revivor clearly is not included.
Papers which are included as part of a pleading, such as exhibits,68
may become part of the judgment roll, although affidavits are ex-
cluded.69 Other matters which the court has held to be embraced
within the judgment roll include a referee's report and bill of excep-
64. 185 Okla. at 461-62, 94 P.2d at 835 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
65. Record entry is vital here, and does not refer to a mere minute notation by the court clerk
on the appearance docket of a particular case. Neither the court clerk's minutes nor minute en-
tries on the docket are acceptable for civil appellate review. See supra note 56; infra notes 80-81 &
155 and accompanying text.
66. 185 Okla. at 462, 94 P.2d at 835. It should be noted that a new proceeding, filed in the
court where the original judgment was rendered, attacking the original judgment, such as a
delayed attack permitted under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1031, 1033, 1038 (1981), would initiate an
entirely new judgment roll as well.
67. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706 (1981).
68. See Sabin v. Levorsen, 193 Okla. 320, 322, 145 P.2d 402, 405, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 792
(1943); see also Gamble v. Emery, 94 Okla. 167, 168, 221 P. 514, 515 (1923) (quiet title ruling by
Indian Territory Land Commissioner, incorporated into petition as exhibit, reviewable as part of
judgment roll); Gourley v. Williams, 46 Okla. 629, 630-32, 149 P. 229, 229-30 (1915) (copy of
promissory notes and mortgage, attached to petition as exhibit, accepted and reviewed on appeal
by transcript of record). But see Turner v. Sooner Oil & Gas Co., 206 Okla. 344, 345-46, 243 P.2d
701, 704-05 (1952) (construction of prior judgment being challenged, incorporated by reference
into plaintifi's petition, not reviewable on appeal without inclusion of exhibit of which trial court
took judicial notice).
69. City of Kingfisher v. Pratt, 4 Okla. 284, 285, 43 P. 1068, 1069 (1896).
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tions taken from the hearing before the referee,70 an agreed statement
of facts,7 ' and jury instructions.72 In addition, a motion for judgment
on the pleadings has been considered by case law as equivalent to a
demurrer, and is thus a pleading within the statutory definition.73
Other matters raised by motion during the pre-trial and trial stage,
however, are not considered automatically "of record" via the judg-
ment roll. Motions to quash service of process or for change of venue
are not included;74 neither are motions going to the admissibility of
evidence75 nor demurrers to the evidence. 76 In short, all papers requir-
ing the introduction of evidence for their proper disposition and inter-
pretation are excluded from the record proper. Evidence itself is
expressly excluded by statute.7 7
Finally, case law appears to have largely ignored the various dock-
ets in the court clerk's office, as well as the entries on them, as related to
the record proper.78 Although the Dime Savings opinion by implica-
tion excluded the execution and judgment dockets,79 the appearance
and trial dockets have received almost no treatment by the court in this
regard.80 However, the clerk's minutes, and minute entries on the ap-
70. See Tribal Dev. Co. v. White, 28 Okla. 525, 528-29, 114 P. 736, 737-38 (1911).
71. Patterson v. Carter, 83 Okla. 70,71, 200 P. 855, 856 (1921). Contra Bank ofVa. v. Bank
of Chillicothe, 16 Ohio 170, 172-73 (1847).
72. Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 239 P. 2d 1028 (1950); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 578
(1981) ("A party excepting to the giving of instructions, or the refusal thereof, shall not be re-
quired to file a formal bill of exceptions. ... ).
73. See Lockett v. Ely-Walker Dry Goods Co., 60 Okla. 131, 132, 159 P. 324, 324 (1916);
Burdett v. Burdett, 26 Okla. 416, 421-22, 109 P. 922, 924 (1910), appeal dismissed, 220 U.S. 627
(1911).
74. Bowman v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 385 P.2d 440,443 (Okla. 1963) (motion to quash
not reviewable on transcript of record appeal unless included in bill of exceptions or casemade);
Kelleam v. Kelleam, 198 Okla. 380, 383, 178 P.2d 604, 607 (1946); Fancher v. State, 61 Okla.
Crim. 447, 449, 69 P.2d 409, 410 (1937) (motion to change venue not part of record proper).
75. See McDonald v. Strawn, 78 Okla. 271, 274, 190 P. 558, 560 (1920).
76. Id
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.1 (1981).
78. However, docket entries may definitely be used as evidence of record material in a court
proceeding to prove a record's existence for nunc pro tune entry or to reconstruct a record. See,
e.g., McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 626 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Okla. 1981); Woodmansee v.
Woodmansee, 137 Okla. 112, 114-15, 278 P. 278, 280 (1929).
79. 185 Okla. at 461, 94 P.2d at 835.
80. But see Little v. Employer's Casualty Co., 180 Okla. 628, 71 P.2d 687 (1937). In Little,
the court expressly held that notice of intention to appeal, required by statute to be entered on the
trial court's trial docket, became a part of the judgment roll when so entered on the trial docket or
on the appearance docket. Id at 629, 71 P.2d at 687. The fact that the notice wds a jurisdictional
prerequisite to appeal may have influenced the court in its decision, as well as the fact that no
particular form or substance was required for the notice, other than that it be given in open court
after rendition ofjudgment or in writing within 10 days after rendition. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 954
(1961) (repealed 1968). The notice of intent to appeal is no longer required, leaving the status of
1983]
15
Opala and Duensing: The Immortal Remnants of the Common-Law Record Concept in Oklahom
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
TULSA LAW JOUARAL
pearance docket, have received a fair amount of attention and the
message has been consistently clear: not only are the minutes and min-
ute entries excluded from the judgment roll, but they also are inappro-
priate for the appellate record as a whole. Unlike written motions and
rulings thereon, which today may be reviewed upon designation for
inclusion in the appellate record, the unsigned minutes or minute en-
tries, even if designated and included in the appellate record, present
nothing for review in a civil appeal."'
B. The Judgment Roll's Signjlcance Today
Though it has become obsolete in some respects, the judgment roll
retains vital significance today as the only means available to preserve,
forever, the rights gained or lost by a party in a trial court proceeding.
Once the time to appeal from a judgment has expired, 2 any later at-
tempt to construe the meaning of that judgment is limited to the face of
the judgment roll itself. 3 The relevance of this restriction, particularly
as to judgments which will be relied upon forever, such as a quiet title
decree, is obvious. Lawyers must ensure that all papers belonging on
the judgment roll of an action are properly saved and recorded so that
should an ambiguity arise at some future time, a judge will be able to
construe-from the four comers of the judgment roll alone-what
rights were granted or restrictions imposed.
In Peerson v. Mitchell,' a 1950 opinion in which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court upheld and applied this restriction, the court discussed
the Little holding, as applicable to other docket entries, in doubt. In reference to minute entries
on the appearance docket, see infra note 81.
81. See Render v. Henry Schafer, Inc., 198 Okla. 95, 95, 175 P.2d 330, 331 (1946); Little v.
Employer's Casualty Co., 180 Okla. 628, 629, 71 P.2d 687, 688 (1937); Kenney v. Neumeyer, 171
Okla. 1, 1, 41 P.2d 869, 870 (1935).
82. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990 (1981); OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.15; see also id 1.11 (com-
putation of time for appeals); id 1.12 (when motion for new trial will extend appeal time).
83. See Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 532-33, 239 P.2d 1028, 1030-31 (1950); Russell v.
Freeman, 202 Okla. 417, 419, 214 P.2d 439, 441-42 (1949); Reaves v. Turner, 20 Okla. 492, 495-96,
94 P. 543, 544 (1908). Later courts are also limited to the face of the judgment roll when a judg-
ment is attacked as void on its face. See, e.g., Sabin v. Levorsen, 193 Okla. 320, 320, 145 P.2d 402,
403, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 792 (1943) (syllabus by the court).
A judgment will not be held void on its face unless it affirmatively appears from an
inspection of the judgment roll that one or more of the following jurisdictional elements
are absent: (1) jurisdiction of the person; (2) jurisdiction of the subject matter; (3) judi-
cial power to render the particular judgment.
Id In Sabin, the court also stated and applied the rule that when a judgment is subject to collat-
eral attack, the court will presume that the trial court rendering the judgment required proper
evidence before rendition, even if the introduction of such evidence does not appear on the judg-
ment roll. Id at 323, 145 P.2d at 405.
84. 205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028 (1950).
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at length the rule's long-standing use in Oklahoma case law.85 In Peer-
son, the court faced an appeal from a trial court denial of a motion by
the defendant Peerson to release of record a 1935 judgment against him
which he claimed had been discharged by his 1938 bankruptcy. 6 The
trial court, looking only to the face of the judgment roll 7 in the 1935
action, found that the judgment constituted a debt for "wilful and mali-
cious injury," and that under the Bankruptcy Act, "one may not be
discharged from obligations arising out of wilful and malicious acts."88
Peerson claimed that evidence introduced in the original trial of the
case should be used to construe the judgment and would show that the
true grounds for the jury verdict and judgment were in negligence, thus
creating a dischargeable debt. He had neglected, however, to assure
that the negligence theory was included in any of the papers on file in
the case which were "of record" and the supreme court refused to look
further.
As disclosed by the discussion of the pleadings and instruc-
tions of the court this cause of action was predicated entirely
upon the harboring of a vicious dog and submitted to the jury
on that theory only. By the plain terms of the Bankruptcy Act
... a judgment based upon wilful and malicious injury can-
not be discharged.
Where the record proper. ..which is synonymous with
the judgment roll at common law. . . shows the judgment is
based upon knowingly harboring a vicious dog, wilful and
malicious conduct inheres or is implicit in said judgment and
resort to the evidence may not be had to establish that the
judgment was based on negligence.89
Attorneys themselves are not immune from the rule, as shown by
the recent case of Sooner Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Mobley.9" In Sooner, attorneys in a prior divorce proceeding were
barred from filing claims against their judgment debtor's homestead in
a mortgage foreclosure action because the attorneys had failed to have
85. Id at 532-34, 239 P.2d at 1030-32.
86. Id at 530-31, 239 P.2d at 1028-29.
87. InPeerson, the judgment roll in the 1935 case consisted of the plaintiff's petition alleging
Peerson had knowingly allowed his "ill-tempered, mean, vicious, dangerous" dog to run at large;
the defendant's general demurrer, the jury instructions, which went to the question of liability for
knowingly harboring a vicious dog; the verdict against Peerson; and the judgment entered on the
verdict without reservation. Id at 531-32, 239 P.2d at 1029-30.
88. Id at 531, 239 P.2d at 1029.
89. Id at 532, 239 P.2d at 1030 (citations omitted).
90. 645 P.2d 1000 (Okla. 1981), modrfed on rehearing, 645 P.2d 1000, 1003-05 (Okla. 1982).
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the judge include, in the divorce decree awarding attorney fees, a pro-
vision that a statutory attorney's lien also was being placed on the
homestead until the debt was discharged. 9' Thus, the decree was con-
strued as awarding only an ordinary money judgment, which could not
be enforced against the homestead property.92 Though the court did
not specifically address the "four comers of the judgment roll" issue,
the restriction obviously was applied in construing the prior decree.93
III. APPLICATIONS: THE VESTIGIAL EFFECTS OF THE COMMON
LAW'S ISSUE OF LAW/ISSUE OF FACT DICHOTOMY ON NEW
TRIAL MOTIONS IN OKLAHOMA TODAY
The new trial, which is defined in part as "a reexamination in the
same court of an issue of fact, or of law, either or both, '94 is inextrica-
bly bound to the common-law definitions of "issue of law" and "issue
of fact" which Oklahoma has adopted. An "issue of law" arises only
upon "a demurrer to the petition, answer or reply, or to some part
thereof."95 An "issue of fact" arises in one of three situations, all re-
lated to the pleadings: (1) on a "material allegation in the petition,
controverted by the answer"; (2) on "new matter in the answer, contro-
verted by the [plaintiff's] reply"; and (3) on "new matter in the reply,"
presumed controverted without further pleading.96
The issue of law/issue of fact distinction is derived from the strict
line drawn by the common law between "matters of record" and "mat-
ters not of record." 97 Only trial court decisions on issues of law, which
arose from the face of "matter of record" or the judgment roll, were
reviewable in a proceeding in error. Issues of fact, on the other hand,
91. Id at 1002-03.
92. Id On rehearing, the court's holding was modified as to one of the attorneys, who alleged
he had proof of a judgment, issued after the decree, imposing a statutory attorney's lien on the
property. The attorney did not make the judgment a part of the record proper of either the di-
vorce decree or mortgage foreclosure, however, and the court refused to review the judgment as
presented (attached to the brief on petition for rehearing). Instead, the court remanded the case to
the trial court, with instructions to review the judgment award's validity and to render judgment
for the attorney if the lien was determined valid. Id at 1004-05.
93. The court looked only to the divorce decree itself in construing its meaning in light of
OK.A. STAT. tit. 31, §§ I(A)(1), 9(1981), which set forth property protected by homestead exemp-
tion and debts to which the homestead exemption does not apply respectively.
94. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 651 (1981). The full statutory definition provides that a new trial
reexamines an issue of law or fact "after a verdict by a jury, the approval of the report of a referee,
or a decision by the court." Id
95. Id § 553.
96. Id § 554.
97. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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were not "matters of record" because their resolution occurred at the
trial proceeding. The bill of exceptions enabled review of some issues
of fact. Ironically, "questions of law" arising during the proceeding
could be reviewed upon proper exception.98 Thus, only "questions of
fact," which were a type of issue of fact, remained unreviewable on
appeal after the bill of exceptions was introduced. 99
At one time in Oklahoma, the issue of law/issue of fact distinction
was vital to an appeal. New trials were allowed only on issues of fact t°°
and a new trial motion was a mandatory prerequisite to appellate re-
view of matters occurring during the trial.'0 1 As shown by the defini-
tion of "new trial," 02 new trials today can reexamine both issues of law
and fact; and, in any case, a new trial motion is not a prerequisite to
appellate review. 0 3 Yet the common-law definitions of issue of law
and issue of fact retain viability because they affect the extension of
appeal time, and the issue of law/issue of fact dichotomy remains an
invaluable aid in determining whether a court reporter's transcript of
trial proceedings is necessary on appeal.
98. Sunderland, supra note 7, at 653. This is true in Oklahoma law, which defines an excep-
tion as "an objection taken to a decision of the court or judge upon amatter of law." OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 631 (1981) (emphasis added).
99. Sunderland, supra note 7, at 653.
The very essence of a proceeding in error involved the conception of wrong judicial
conduct on the part of the judge. He had no control over the conclusions which the jury
might draw from the evidence, and if they went wrong it was sufficient to say that it was
no fault of his. Therefore no error could be assigned upon any matter of fact.
Summarizing the scope of this common law system of review, it may be said that it
dealt best with the least important class of questions, namely, controlling errors of law
which appeared upon the judgment roll, that it dealt clumsily, by means of new trials,
with those incidental errors of law which affected the course of the trial and influenced
the conduct of the jury; and that it dealt not at all with pure errors of fact.
Id
100. This was the case until 1963. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 651 (1961), amended by Act of
June 13, 1963, ch. 239, § 1, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 326, 326-27 (current version at OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 651 (1981)).
101. See Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1964). Poafpybilly construed
the addition of reexamination of issues of law to the new trial provision as requiring a new trial
motion prior to appellate review of any judgment. This holding has since been overturned by
statute. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991(a) (1981). The case remains viable, however, in this context for
its delineation of the issue of law/issue of fact dichotomy in relation to new trial motions-and for
the confusion which reliance on the dichotomy has caused.
The mischief sought to be corrected by the amendment to Sec. 651 [i.e., allowing
reexamination in the trial court of issues of law] was the uncertainty and doubt which
existed in many instances as to the necessity for a motion for a new trial. The situation
contributed to a dismissal of a large number of appeals, and in borderline cases caused a
cautious practitioner to perfect both an appeal from the judgment and one from the
order overruling motion for new trial.
394 P.2d at 519.
102. See supra text accompanying note 94.
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991(a) (1981); OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.12(a).
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A. New Trial Motions Extending Time to File anAppeal °
Although several types of trial court orders are appealable, a new
trial motion will extend the time to appeal only if it is filed after the
trial court has rendered a final order or judgment. 05 Determining
whether a new trial motion is authorized to extend appeal time thus
requires simultaneous examination of several statutory provisions con-
cerning judgments, final orders, issues, and the new trial provision it-
self. An improvidently filed new trial motion could be fatal to a later
appeal from the judgment. 0 6
The common-law definitions of issues are incorporated by refer-
ence into the Oklahoma Supreme Court's definition of a final judgment
as "the trial court's determination of all issues in controversy."', 7 The
court's definition encompasses issues arising on the merits of a claim or
defense, 10 8 as opposed to collateral issues. Thus, an attorney planning
to direct a new trial motion at what he thinks is a judgment must en-
sure that all issues on the merits are finally disposed of by the trial
court before the motion is filed'0 9 and must file the motion within ten
104. "If a motion for new trial or a postjudgment motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is filed in time, no party shall appeal from the decision and appeal time shall not begin to
run until the motion shall have been disposed of." OKLA. R. Civ. ApP. P. 1.12(b).
105. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has promulgated rules for civil appeals which define "de-
cisions" of the district court to which a new trial may be directed as including both final judgment
and final order. Iad 1.10(a), 1.12(a). Rule 1.12(c) enumerates the exceptions where a new trial
motion will not extend appeal time including a motion addressed to the grant or denial of a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, id 1.12(c)(IV), to the denial ofa new trial, or to
modification or refusal to vacate a final judgment on any ground specified in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,§§ 651, 655 (1981), OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.12(c)(I). Rule 1.40(d) provides that filing a motion or
petition for new trial will not extend appeal time from an appealable interlocutory order.
106. An appeal must be commenced within 30 days from the rendition of the final order or
judgment, unless a new trial motion authorized to extend appeal time is filed. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 990 (1981); OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.15(a); see also Timeplan Corp. v. O'Connor, 461 P.2d 935,
935 (Okla. 1969) (new trial motion filed more than 10 days after rendition of judgment, as pro-
vided by OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 653 (1981), is ineffective to extend appeal time and results in
dismissal unless appellate proceedings have been initiated within 30 days following rendition of
judgment). See OKLA. R. Civ. APr. P. 1.12(c) for examples of motions which will extend appeal
time.
107. OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.10(a)(13) (emphasis added). See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 681
(1981) for a definition of'judgment." The statutory definition of issues in general is found in id
§ 552.
108. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 681 (1981) where the legislature used the term "rights of the
parties to an action" rather than the term "issues" in its definition of judgment.
109. In Barrows v. Cassidy, 113 Okla. 114, 239 P. 581 (1925), for example, the appellant had
filed a new trial motion in the trial court before rendition of final judgment. The supreme court
dismissed the appeal, stating that a "prematurely filed [new trial motion] is as much out of time as
when filed too late." Id at 115, 239 P. at 582. The appellants had not refied the motion following
rendition of judgment and, at that time, a new trial motion was a prerequisite to appellate review
of errors occurring at trial, meaning issues of fact.
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days after rendition of final judgment.' t0
In addition, the statutory definition of new trial includes a reexam-
ination only of issues of law and fact arising on the merits. This sug-
gests that the new trial motion must seek reexamination of issues
arising on the merits, on one or more of the nine grounds enumerated
in section 651 of title 12." t' Despite this suggestion, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, by rule, which has the force of statute, has defined
"decision" as including all final orders as well as judgments.'' 2 Orders
granting or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, orders denying a new trial, or orders modifying or refusing to va-
cate a final judgment on any ground specified in sections 561 and 655
of title 12 are not final orders."i 3
Thus, a new trial motion will not extend appeal time if it goes
solely to a trial court decision on a matter collateral to the merits that
did not result in a final order. One example is a new trial motion going
solely to the denial or grant of a temporary injunction. A timely filed
new trial motion will extend appeal time, however, from any final judg-
ment or final order, even if the order went to a collateral issue of law or
fact.
110. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 653 (1981). However, if the grounds for new trial are newly discov-
ered evidence or impossibility of procuring a transcript of the evidence, the movant may file a
petition for new trial within one year from rendition of judgment. Id. §§ 653, 655.
The movant also should be aware that acceptance of a jury's verdict by a trial court without
reservation constitutes rendition ofjudgment. However, "[i]fjudgment on jury verdict is reserved
or if the case is tried to the court," judgment is not rendered until its terms are "completely pro-
nounced by the judge and clearly resolve all the issues in controversy." OKLA. R. Ctv. APP. P.
1.1 l(b); see Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. McBroom, 526 P.2d 509, 512 (Okla. 1974).
111. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 651 (1981). Nor can the new trial motion merely parrot the statu-
tory grounds for new trial. The motion must "adequately inform the trial court of the errors
sought to be alleged." Federal Corp. v. Independent School Dist. No. 13, 606 P.2d 1141, 1144
(Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (approved for publication by Okla. Sup. Ct., Feb. 14, 1980) (prospective in
effect from Feb. 8, 1980).
112. OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.10(a).
The following are considered final orders: (1) the denial of a timely and proper new trial
motion; (2) grant of a postjudgment motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or denial of
same; (3) modification or refusal to vacate or modify a final judgment; (4) any order defined under
§ 953 of title 12; and (5) any other order precluding a party from proceeding further in the case.
See OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.11(b). Section 953, referred to in rule 1.11, provides:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, deter-
mines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substantial right,
made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judg-
ment, is a final order, which may be vacated, modified, or reversed. ...
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1981).
113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 651 (1981) (listing grounds on which new trial is warranted); id
§ 655 (providing for petition for new trial when grounds are newly discovered evidence or impos-
sibility of procuring transcript of evidence or proceedings).
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B. The Issue of Law/Issue of Fact Dichotomy's Effect on Necessity of
a Transcript of Proceedings and Evidence
At common law, and in Oklahoma's earliest territorial days, errors
of the court as to issues of fact, such as erroneous rulings at the trial,
which were not "matters of record" could be brought to the appeals
court by a bill of exceptions. 4 After the turn of the century, however,
the casemade" 15 became the dominant means in Oklahoma of bringing
issues of fact up on appeal. Today, this role of both the bill of excep-
tions and casemade has been taken over largely by the court reporter's
transcript of proceedings or evidence." 6
Appellate review does not always require a court reporter's tran-
script of the proceedings, however, and the issue of law/issue of fact
dichotomy can assist in determining one circumstance where such a
transcript would be entirely superfluous. When the only issue
presented for review is the trial court's decision on an issue of law,
there is no need for a device to bring up issues of fact. If the alleged
error appears on the face of the record proper or judgment roll, a tran-
script of trial proceedings is unnecessary."t Any time an issue of fact is
presented, however, a court reporter's transcript is necessary.
Technically, a motion for new trial could present a problem in the
issue of law situation, because a new trial motion is not itself a part of
the record proper. 18 However, the requirement that assignments of
error specified in the new trial motion match the assignments in the
petition in error, 1 9 the ability to designate the written motion for inclu-
114. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
116. See OKLA. R. Civ. App. P. 1.20(a), 1.25(c); see also id 1.22 (allowing preparation of
narrative statement by the attorneys in certain circumstances in lieu of court reporter's transcript).
117. This is implied by a statement of the court in In re Rich, 604 P.2d 1248 (Okla. 1979).
"Where the record does not contain evidence presented at trial and no errors appearing on the
face of the judgment roll are assigned, there is nothing for us to review and the trial court's judg-
ment may not be disturbed." Id at 1253. The appellant's failure to include the transcript of
proceedings caused affirmance of the trial court's judgment. Id
118. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. This problem was not present at common
law or in Oklahoma until 1963, since new trials were limited to reexamination of issues of fact
alone. The trial judge was without jurisdiction to reexamine his own decision on issues of law and
thus a new trial motion going to such issues was not authorized. See supra notes 100-01 and
accompanying text. Many supreme court opinions which address only issues of law are rendered
in cases where review was sought by transcript of record appeal. E.g., Bowman v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 385 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1963); Grissom v. Beidleman, 35 Okla. 343, 129 P. 853
(1912).
119. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991(b) (1981). But see Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla.
1973). The court held that the trial court's failure to perform a "ministerial duty" as directed by
state statute was reviewable even though no assignment of error on that point appeared in the
motion for new trial or the petition in error. The court noted, however, that this ground had not
[Vol. 18:541
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sion in the appellate record, and the necessary written evidence of the
judge's order, including the judge's signature, on the motion, 20 elimi-
nate the need for a special device to bring the motion's allegations
before the appeals court for review. Other motions and issues arising
on anything other than demurrers to the pleadings, however, require
the preparation of a court reporter's transcript for inclusion in the ap-
pellate record.
IV. MODERN USAGE
The strict meaning of the common-law record is no longer adhered
to in judicial and litigative parlance. As a result, the subject matter
seems confusing, particularly in light of the greater number, type, and
form of records which an appellate court may review. No longer is
there assurance, as there was at common law, that when reference is
made to the "record" in an appellate opinion or brief, the reference is
to some "matter of record," the "record proper," or the "judgment
roll."'12' Easing this confusion requires greater specificity of refer-
ence, 122 which in turn requires greater understanding of the items in-
cluded in the appellate record.
As at common law, today's appellate record may be comprised of
two distinct sections: 23 the designated instruments on file in the court
clerk's case file' 24 and the trial record, or court reporter's transcript of
proceedings or evidence, 25 by which errors occurring at trial are pre-
served for review. Unlike at common law, however, the papers in-
cluded in the case file, where all papers filed in the case are kept, are
not restricted to only those properly a part of the judgment roll; Any
arisen until after the new trial motion was filed and thus was not available to the appellant at that
time. Id at 1364-66.
120. See Boxberger v. Martin, 552 P.2d 370, 371-72 (Okla. 1976) (court permitted the appel-
late record to be amended nunc pro tunc so that the signed orders on motions for new trial and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, fied after timely petition in error was fied, could be added
to the appellate record).
121. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Lehman, 462 P.2d 649, 650 (Okla. 1969)
(matter "that is dehors the record" refers to matter not on appellate record).
122. In the modem appeal, for example, if reference is made in the brief to a paper in the
designated record that came from the clerk's file, the reference should specify the instrument itself
and note that it is found within the assembled paperwork from the clerk's file. If an item was ified
as a trial exhibit, reference should be to the "trial exhibit found at page - of the transcript of the
evidence," or "trial record."
123. At common law, these segments were found in the judgment roll, which might include a
bill of exceptions containing errors occurring at trial. See supra notes 7-13.




Opala and Duensing: The Immortal Remnants of the Common-Law Record Concept in Oklahom
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:541
instrument on file may be designated for inclusion in the appellate rec-
ord.12 6 Thus, the case file, rather than the judgment roll, has in many
ways become the keystone of today's appellate record.
Nevertheless, perfecting a record for civil appeal involves more
than merely designating existing instruments and specifying them in
the appellate brief. An attorney also must assure that all necessary
items, 27 in their proper form, are included so that the reviewing court
can perform its function. Even today, the common-law requirements
of form inhere as to certain papers; only the methods of achieving that
form have changed.
Though the term is rarely used today,2 8 "record entry" of an ap-
pealable order has always been a prerequisite to review of that order. 2 9
"Record entry" has had an extremely garbled history in Oklahoma
case law, stemming primarily from the failure, by courts and attorneys
alike, to discern the difference between "journal entry" and "record
entry." The trial court's journal is equivalent to a common-law court's
official record of a proceeding, the parchment plea roll onto which the
parties' pleadings and the process were transcribed. After final judg-
ment was entered of record on the roll, it became the judgment roll. 30
Upon completion, the roll was deposited in the court's registry for eter-
126. Id 1.20(a), (b).
127. It is estimated that more than half of the completed, designated portions of the appellate
records on file in the Tulsa County Court Clerk's Office need to be re-opened-and reorganized-
for additional material after notice of completion of the designated portion has been sent to the
parties. Interview with Don Perram, head of Tulsa County Court Clerk's Civil Division (Oct. 15,
1982). A review of designations filed in the office revealed a variety of listings, ranging from a
cursory designation of "All Pleadings, Motions and Orders" and "The Complete Record" to
lengthy lists of specifically named papers. Perram suggested that attorneys, when preparing a
designation of record, use the case's appearance docket as a reference guide and as a reminder of
what papers may still need to be filed. Id
128. But see McCullough v. Safeway Stores, 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 n.8 (Okla. 1981) (record
entry distinguished from minute entry).
129. See Willitt v. ASG Indus., Inc., 572 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Okla. 1978); Long v. McMahan, 205
Okla. 696, 696, 241 P.2d 185, 185 (1952) (syllabus by the court); City of Tulsa v. Kay, 124 Okla.
243, 244, 255 P. 684, 685 (1927); Board of Comm'rs v. Vann, 60 Okla. 86, 86, 159 P. 297, 297
(1916).
Record entry is not essential to the validity of a judgment as between the parties, however.
McCullough v. Safeway Stores, 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 n.8 (Okla. 1981). Nor has record entry always
been considered a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. As noted in the Willitt case,
"defective records [will] not defeat jurisdiction if a proper petition in error is timely filed." 572
P.2d at 1297. Whether the Willi statement is true today, however, is questionable in light of the
legislature's 1981 amendment to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.2 (1981), requiring that a recorded writ-
ten instrument, signed by the judge and specifying the relief sought, is ajurisdictional prerequisite
to appellate review. Act of Apr. 13, 1981, ch. 66, § 1, 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 103, 103.
130. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
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nal preservation13 ' and was the only "record" available for appellate
review.
In order to accommodate the common-law mode, Oklahoma stat-
utes from the earliest days provided for the following: (1) A court
"journal," containing the proceedings of the court each day;132
(2) "journal entries," providing that "[aill judgments and orders must
be entered on the journal of the court and specify clearly the relief
granted or order made in [the] action"; 33 (3) a formal "record," com-
piled by the clerk on order of the trial court, for each "cause as soon as
it is finally determined,"' 34 with the record containing "[mlaterial for
[the] record,"' 35 which has been held by many Oklahoma courts to be
equivalent to the judgment roll at common law 136 (the trial judge was
required to sign this "record");137 and (4) a duty, imposed on each
court, to assure that its "judicial acts [and] proceedings" were recorded,
examined, and if found correct, signed.
38
These provisions prompted two basic lines of interpretation in case
law. The first, and majority, viewpoint held that entry on the court's
journal was a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review. "Entry
on the court journal" and "record entry" were equivalent terms, and
entries reflected on the journal of the court were the best-and only-
evidence of the trial court's true judgment acceptable on appeal.' 39
131. Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okla. 277, 296, 190 P. 681, 700 (1920).
132. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 733 (1893) (current version as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 24
(1981)).
133. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 427 (1893) (codified from 1941-1971 at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 701)
(repealed 1971).
134. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 428 (1893) (codified from 1941-1972 at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 702)
(repealed 1972).
135. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.1 (1982) (original version at OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 430 (1893)).
136. See supra note 28.
137. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 429 (1893) (codified from 1941-1972 at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 703)
(repealed 1972).
138. OKLA. STAT. ch. 66, § 431 (1893) (current version at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.2 (1981)).
139. See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Kay, 124 Okla. 243, 244, 255 P. 684, 685 (1929) (appeal dis-
missed because casemade failed to show final order denying new trial had been entered on court
journal: "The court here speaks through its journal, and, when the journal is silent as to any act
upon which jurisdiction on appeal depends, the appeal must be dismissed."); Apple v. American
Nat'l Bank, 104 Okla. 69,70,231 P. 79, 80-81 (1924) (trial court decision affirmed; appellant failed
to file and have entered on trial court journal court's order overruling demurrer to plaintiffs sup-
plemental petition); Hilligoss v. Webb, 60 Okla. 89, 89, 159 P. 291, 292 (1916) (dismissed in part
because appellate "record falls to show that the judgment of the trial court. . . was entered of
record [on the court journal] in the trial court"); Hirsh v. Twyford, 40 Okla. 220, 224-26, 139 P.
314, 314-15 (1913) (court clerk's refusal to enter "of record" a signed, filed "journal entry" quiet-
ing title in appellant endangered appellant's title to property); Cockrell v. Schmitt, 20 Okla. 207,
214-15, 94 P. 521, 523 (1908) (overruled by Cumby v. State ex rel. Vinzant, 468 P.2d 490 (Okla.
1970)) (judge-signed "journal entry"--i.e., instrument setting out terms ofjudgment--deemed in-
1983]
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The appellate court was able to tell that a certain judgment had been
entered on the court journal if the copy of the judgment contained a
book and page number showing where it had been recorded.1 40 From
these cases the notion developed that a "matter of record" was that
which had been, or was required to be, recorded in the trial court's
journal.14 1
The second line of cases held that the "court journal" and "journal
entry" requirements were ministerial in nature and directory to the
court clerk.' 42 In this second line of cases, "record entry" of a judg-
sufficient evidence of prior judgment without proof of its "entry" on trial court journal); Exparle
Stevenson, 20 Okla. 549, 551-52, 94 P. 1071, 1071-72 (1908) (overruled by Cumby v. State ex rel
Vinzant, 468 P.2d 490 (Okla. 1970)) (record entry of trial court order or judgment on court journal
is indispensable to prove the judgment in later action).
In Cockrell, the court stated,
All judgments and orders must be entered on the journal of the court, and specify
clearly the relief granted or order made in (the) action.
. . IRjecord entry ofajudgment is indispensable to furnish the evidence of it when
it is made the basis of a claim or defense in another court.
• . . The minutes from which the judgment is made up, and even a judgment in
paper, signed by the master, are not proper evidence of the record.
20 Okla. at 214-15, 94 P. at 523-24 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
The "record entry" requirement also extended to judgments rendered on jury verdicts, In
Long v. McMahan, 205 Okla. 696, 241 P.2d 185 (1952), the court, on its own motion, dismissed an
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant's casemade did not affirmatively show that
judgment on the verdict had been "entered of record" in the trial court. Id at 696-97, 241 P.2d at
186-87. This occurred even though the casemade contained what the court called a "journal en-
try" showing denial of a new trial motion and despite the court's recognition of the jury's verdict.
Id at 696, 241 P.2d at 186.
140. See Board of Comm'rs v. Vann, 60 Okla. 86, 86, 159 P. 297, 297-98 (1916) (appeal dis-
missed because trial court decree included in casemade, though it contained a statement that it
had been filed in the court clerk's office, failed to show affirmatively where on the court's journal it
had been recorded).
141. See Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Kitchen, 337 P.2d 1081, 1083-85 (Okla. 1959) (case-
made allowed to be withdrawn so that order on new trial motion, which appeared in transcript of
evidence, could be reduced to writing, signed by judge, and entered "of record" in the case).
"Record," as used in such cases, does not refer to the "judgment roll," which tends to confuse the
subject matter even more. Here, "record" is used in reference to the trial court journal, and the
necessity of entering a new trial denial order thereon. The new trial motion and rulings thereon
are not properly part of the judgment roll, or record proper, unless made so by a bill of exceptions.
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. To heighten the confusion even more, compare
State ex rel Dep't of Highways v. Lehman, 462 P.2d 649, 650 (Okla. 1969) (evidence "dehors the
record" refers to matter not included in appellate record at all) with Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okla.
277, 284, 190 P. 681, 688 (1920) (evidence "dehors the record" refers to matter not properly a part
of the judgment roll).
142. See, e.g., Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 302-03, 226 P. 101, 101-
03 (1924) ("journal entry," (written instrument) signed by attorneys and included in casemade
(appellate record) signed by judge, but not showing recordation on court journal, accepted as
sufficient evidence ofjudgment on which to base appeal because journal recordation requirements
held ministerial, not jurisdictional); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Taliaferro, 58 Okla. 585, 587, 160 P.
610, 611 (1916) (court accepted written instrument showing extension of time to make and serve
casemade, included in casemade, even though order did not show it had been entered on court
26
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ment appeared to be achieved when written evidence of a judgment,
signed by the judge and both attorneys, was filed with the court clerk
and then included on a proper appellate record.1 4
3
As if these conflicting lines of interpretation are not enough to blur
the concept, opinions favoring either interpretation frequently used the
term "journal entry" to refer to the written instrument containing the
terms of a judgment, which was filed with the court clerk, for inclusion
in the case file and recordation on the court journal, after rendition of
judgment. 44 And, more recently, a dissenting opinion has suggested
that a judgment entered in absentia be considered entered as of the date
of the judge's decision shown by a minute entry on the appearance
docket, even though actual rendition of the judgment occurred much
later. 145  Add one more record-garbling usage-the careless substitu-
tion of the word "entered" for "rendered" when referring to a court's
pronouncement of judgment to all parties to the action'4---and the
hazy shadow of case-by-case law on the once-definite meaning of com-
mon-law "record entry" becomes even darker.
In 1968, the jurisdictional barrier constructed by the first line of
cases appeared to be destroyed by statute. Section 990 of title 12 was
amended to provide that "except for the filing of a petition in error as
provided herein, all steps in perfecting an appeal are not jurisdic-
tional."' 47 In 1970, the "best evidence" rationale of those cases was
also removed. In the case of Cumby v. State ex rel. Vinzant,148 the
journal; "Nowhere in [statutes providing for casemade] is there any requirement that the case
shall show the condition of the record or the performance by the clerk of any ministerial duties
imposed upon him by other provisions of the statute.").
143. In Tahaferro, the court intimated, however, that the result in the case might not have
been acceptable on an appeal by transcript of record, which brought up only the judgment roll, or
record proper, for review. 58 Okla. at 587, 160 P. at 611.
144. Eg., Illinois Banker's Life Ass'n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 303, 226 P. 101, 103 (1924);
Cockrell v. Schmitt, 20 Okla. 207, 213-14, 94 P. 521, 523 (1908).
145. See McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Okla. 1981) (Simms, J.,
concurring specially in part, dissenting in part; Barnes, V.C.J., and Doolin, J., concurring with
Justice Simms) (5-3 decision). McCullough involved an in absentia grant of summary judgment,
the letter ruling of which was not mailed to the parties until nearly two months after minute
notation was made on the appearance docket of the trial judge's decision. The majority of the
court held that rendition of the judgment could not be considered to have occurred until notice of
the decision had been sent to the parties, and thus appeal time did not begin to run until such
notice was sent. Id at 1334-35. In a footnote, the court explained that "record entry" ofjudgment
generally occurred via a "written memorial-most often made nunc pro tunc-which isfiled in the
case and entered on the court's journal." Id at 1335 n.8 (emphasis in original).
146. Such usage generally occurs when the subject at hand is not dealing directly with the
question of the form of entry. See, e.g., Sooner Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Mobley, 645
P.2d 1000, 1004 (Okla. 1982) (supplemental opinion on rehearing).
147. Act of May 3, 1968, ch. 290, § 2, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 469, 469-70.
148. 468 P.2d 490 (Okla. 1970).
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supreme court agreed with the reasoning of the second line of cases that
the statutory "journal" requirements were ministerial in nature, and
relied on statutes pertaining to evidence to hold that written evidence
of a judgment or order, signed by the judge and appearing in the trial
court's case file, was acceptable to prove the judgment. Entry on the
court journal would be presumed. 149 In 1971, the statutory provision
for "journal entries" was repealed 5 ° and in 1972, the statutes pertain-
ing to the court journal, record proper, and proper form of judgment
were revamped and renumbered to provide for: (1) A "journal record,"
on which the clerk mandatorily was to keep copies of items of process
and "[a]ll instruments filed in the case that bear the signature of the
judge and specify clearly the relief sought";' 5 1 (2) repeal of the duty to
compile a formal record and retention of the common-law definition of
"material for record"; 52 and (3) clear imposition of a duty on the
court, or on counsel if directed by the court, to write out orders, judg-
ments, and decrees for the judge's signature and recordation in the case
record. ' 53
Thus by the obvious use of the term "record" in conjunction with
"journal" and "case" in the above provisions, the legislature has incor-
porated the common-law definition of record which has been codified
at section 32.1 of title 12. "Record entry" means entry on the journal
record and occurs after a written instrument signed by the judge, which
specifies clearly the relief granted, is filed in the trial court. The term
"journal entry" continues to be used in reference to the written instru-
ment signed by the judge and, generally, both attorneys. However, a
journal entry does not become a "record entry" until it is placed on the
journal record.' 54 An unsigned minute or minute entry on the appear-
ance docket can never become a record entry for purposes of a civil
appeal. 55 The legislature's provisions also make clear that notation of
149. Id at 492-93.
150. Act of June 16, 1971, ch. 245, § 3, 1971 Okla. Sess. Laws 584, 584.
151. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 24 (1981).
152. Id § 32.1.
153. Id § 32.2.
154. See Cumby v. State ex rel Vinzant, 468 P.2d 490, 493 (Okla. 1970).
155. A "minute" is a synopsis of each transaction concerning a particular case, and can con-
tain information ranging from a few, cursory words as to the final judgment to extensive and in-
depth listings of appearances, names of attorneys, witnesses, experts, and the court reporter, the
type of hearing or trial, the rulings occurring during the trial, and the finding of the court, if any,
or other action taken in regard to the case. Minutes may be taken by the judge or by the judge's
minute clerk, and are generally used as a quick-reference guide by the judge, attorneys, or parties
to the suit. Minutes are "entered" on the appearance docket of a case. In Tulsa County, "minute
sheets," containing all minutes issuing daily from each judge, are bound together in a "minute
[Vol. 18:541
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a judgment on various other "court records" in general, such as the
judgment docket, trial docket, or execution docket, does not constitute
"record entry." These, like the appearance docket, are primarily used
for housekeeping purposes within the court clerk's office or judge's
chambers"5 6 or for public notice.' 57 None require entry of the full
terms of the judgment, as do the journal record and case record
provisions.'"
In 1981, section 32.2 of title 12 was amended so that a "recorded
written order, judgment or decree signed by the court is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to appellate review."' 59 This provision has not yet been
construed in conjunction with section 990.160
A restrictive construction of the 1981 amendment would require
the appealing party, within the thirty days allowed forfiling apetition in
error,'6 1 to (1) have the journal entry settled and (2) have the court
clerk formally place the journal entry "of record" (record entry). This
construction thus would require an affirmative showing of settlement
and recordation on the face of the journal entry, and the absence of
such showing would cause the appeal to fail for lack of appellate juris-
diction. A more lax construction would require that, within the time
required for the completion of an appellate record,6 2 the appealing
book" kept by the court clerk's office. Interview with Sally Howe-Smith, Second Deputy to Tulsa
County Court Clerk Don Austin (Sept. 2, 1982). In some counties, such as Cleveland County,
minutes may not only be prepared by the judge, but they may also be signed by the judge and in
such form become "memorials" of a judgment. Interview with Norma Nichols, Court Clerk of
Cleveland County (Sept. 22, 1982). In this form, the memorialized minute may be acceptable for
appellate review. However, such memorials are often quite cryptic, and should never be relied
upon regularly by attorneys wishing to preserve a judgment indefinitely.
Oklahoma case law has consistently held that unsigned minutes or minute entries cannot be
considered on appeal. See supra note 74. However, an appellate record may be withdrawn to
reduce a judgment to a written, signed instrument if evidence of the judgment, for example in
minute form, appears in the record. Willitt v. ASG Indus., Inc., 572 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Okla. 1978).
156. See supra note 155 for primary use of clerk's minutes.
157. For example, a judgment which is not "alphabetically entered in the judgment docket,"
as required by statute, under the names of all judgment debtors resulting from a judgment, does
not become a lien on the property of unlisted debtors to the detriment of subsequent good faith
purchasers of the debtor's property. Wilson v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Okla. 518, 518, 88 P.2d 628,
629 (1939) (syllabus by the court).
158. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 23, 25-26, 663 (1981) (providing for appearance docket, judg-
ment docket, execution docket, and trial docket, respectively); see also Smith v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 204 Okla. 586, 589-90, 232 P.2d 618, 621-22 (1951) (while entry on court's journal is neces-
sary to prove a judgment itself, entry of judgment debtor's name on judgment docket prior to
purchase by a third person is necessary to defeat good faith purchase from debtor).
159. Act of Apr. 13, 1981, ch. 66, § 1, 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 103, 103 (emphasis added).
160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990 (1981) provides that "except for the filing of a petition in error
as provided herein, all steps in perfecting an appeal are not jurisdictional."
161. OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.15(a).
162. See id 1.26.
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party must have a written memorial, signed by the trial judge, of the
disposition from which appeal is being made, included in the appellate
record. Adoption of the strict construction would deprive trial judges
of their common-law power to enter their own judgments nunc pro
tunc, a power which is recognized in section 32.2 as it stood prior to the
1981 amendment.'63
Regardless of its construction, the amendment highlights the
problems that can occur when too much distance is put between the
common-law record and current procedures under the system of ap-
peals in Oklahoma today. The parchment roll itself may be gone, but
as long as the English-based system of appeals is maintained, the rem-
nants of the record inscribed on that roll will carry on.
163. Prior to its amendment, § 32.2 consisted only of the first paragraph of the current section
which reads:
It is the duty of the court to write out, sign and record its orders, judgments and
decrees within a reasonable time after their rendition. To aid in the performance of this
duty, the court may direct counsel or the court clerk to prepare the written memorializa-
tion for its signature and, after it is signed, to file it in the case record.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.2 (1981).
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